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Abstract 
This article outlines a developmental approach to the study of moral emotions. 
Specifically, we describe our developmental model on moral emotions, one in which 
emotions and cognitions about morality get increasingly integrated and coordinated with 
development, while acknowledging inter-individual variation in developmental trajectories 
across the lifespan. We begin with a conceptual clarification of the concept of moral 
emotions. After a brief review of our own developmental approach to the study of moral 
emotions, we provide a selective summary of the developmental literature on negatively and 
positively valenced moral emotions, and describe a recent line of developmental research on 
the anticipation of negatively and positively valenced moral emotions in multifaceted contexts 
of social exclusion and inclusion. Next, we describe what it means to take a developmental 
perspective on moral emotions. Finally, we provide some preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations for future work to the developmental study of moral emotions.  
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A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions 
Moral emotions have recently regained considerable attention in various disciplines, 
including philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, economy, genetics, and sociology (e.g., 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, 2008b). Unsurprisingly, there has also been an upswell of interest 
around the moral emotions in the development science literature. From a developmental 
perspective, some of the most puzzling questions around human moral emotions are about their 
emergence, development, and their integration and increasing coordination with advancements 
in social-cognitive development. The aim of this article is to describe a developmental 
perspective on the study of moral emotions, which entails dynamic processes of change and 
stability in emotion and relayed cognition across development. We will also provide a selective 
review of the developmental research on moral emotions and provide recommendations for 
promising future avenues to the developmental study of moral emotions.  
What makes a developmental approach to moral emotions distinct from other 
psychological perspectives on human emotions? A developmental perspective puts explicit 
emphasis on an understanding of the processes of change, both across individuals and across 
time. They provide answers to questions like what kind of continuities and discontinuities can 
be observed across time in the occurrence and intensity of emotions in contexts of everyday 
morality, why do these changes or stabilities occur, and how do they predict other dimensions 
of social-emotional development.  Typically, this involves the nomothetic study of normative 
change in moral emotions for example by a comparison between age groups (such as early vs. 
middle childhood). The choice of specific age groups is theoretical in nature and requires 
reflection about developmental milestones and achievements such as children’s increasing 
understanding of others mind, intentions, and complex emotions. Change in emotions is neither 
Developmental Perspective 4 
 
always meaningful nor static. Rather, it involves dynamic processes that may be described as 
linear growth, linear decline, or nonlinear patterns of change. It also includes the study of 
changing relationships between different types of emotions over time. Thus, the developmental 
study of moral emotions entails an investigation of normative changes in the occurrence of 
particular moral emotion(s), which is often, but not always, age-related. Empirically, 
developmental studies on moral emotions have frequently utilized cross-sectional designs to 
compare differences in the expression of moral emotions across age groups. Thus far, the use of 
longitudinal studies to examine moral emotions, albeit of central significance to understand 
patterns of intra-individual change in moral emotions, has been rather limited, with the 
exception of the morally relevant process of empathy/sympathy (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Morris, 
in press) and early forms of guilt (Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002).   
Until a decade ago, developmental studies on morality have been dominated by the 
cognitive-developmental tradition, in light of the influential writings of Piaget (1932, 1999), 
Kohlberg (1984) and Turiel (1983). This tradition has made major contributions to our 
understanding of moral reasoning. However, it has neglected the systematic study of emotions 
and their role in children’s morality. Thus many questions surrounding how children come to 
treat moral norms as personally binding and obligatory were left unanswered. Developmental 
researchers clearly felt an increasing urge to investigate what motivates children to act in accord 
with moral principles. This was, in part, due to the fact that no strong link between moral 
reasoning and moral action was found (Blasi, 1980). Emotions were a prominent candidate for 
further investigation, as emotions matter to us and may therefore serve as an important motive 
for moral action tendencies (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). There was also 
increasing recognition that even young children are voluntarily able to express concern for 
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others and care about needy others (Hoffman, 2000), which led developmental scientists to an 
increasing interest in, and study of, the role of emotions in children’s emerging and developing 
morality.  
What are Moral Emotions? 
Moral emotions have been defined as self-evaluative, self-conscious or other-oriented 
emotions in response to morally salient situations as they either presuppose an evaluation of 
one’s own actions in relation to the consequences they have on others (e.g., leading to guilt), or 
an appreciation (or apprehension) for another’s emotional state (e.g., leading to sympathy; 
Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Thus, moral emotions are elicited by 
one’s evaluative judgments and appraisals (Nussbaum, 2001). Though moral emotions and 
cognitions are closely related, as the evocation of former is dependent on the latter, the two 
facets are distinguishable as emotions enact motivational forces, while cognitions engage 
knowledge structures (Izard, 1994; Malti & Ongley, 2013). Prototypical negatively valenced 
moral emotions are guilt, shame, and compassion, whereas prototypical positively valenced 
moral emotions are pride, gratitude, and elevation (Malti & Latzko, 2012; Tracy, Robins, & 
Tangney, 2007).  
 Moral emotions are necessary for moral action as without experiencing or anticipating 
moral emotions, moral knowledge can be strategically used to manipulate others in order to 
achieve selfishly motivated goals (Gasser & Keller, 2009). We argue that moral emotions are 
complex emotions, which unlike basic emotions, necessarily involve a substantial degree of 
cognitive processing. These emotions developmentally presuppose at least a basic 
understanding of the other’s mind and understanding about why it is wrong to break moral 
norms of fairness, justice, and care (Malti & Ongley, 2013; Malti & Keller, 2010). Research has 
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provided evidence for the role of morally relevant thought in making moral judgments (e.g., the 
intentions of an actor; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & 
Woodward, 2011). Furthermore, neuroscience research has documented that emotion and 
cognition are inherently connected in moral situations in the brain (Blair & Fowler, 2008; 
Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012). Thus, with development, emotions in the context of 
morality may become increasingly tied to an inner world of mental states shared with other 
people (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007), which may give rise to 
more complex emotions, such as guilt. Guilt, in turn, has been shown to predict morally 
relevant behavior (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013).  
Developmental Research on Moral Emotions 
Developmental research on moral emotions has predominantly focused on the morally 
relevant processes of empathy and sympathy (for a review, see Eisenberg et al., in press). This 
research has provided evidence that the first precursors to empathy, the apprehension of 
another’s emotional state, are evident in infants as well as some primates (Flack & de Waal, 
2000). In the first year of life, the ability to distinguish between the self and the other is an 
important developmental milestone that contributes to the development of empathy (Hoffman, 
2000). The emergence of sympathy, which entails a feeling of sorrow for another (but, unlike 
empathy, does not necessarily involve mimicking their emotional state) and an understanding of 
their circumstance, emerges later (Eisenberg et al., 2006) and continues to develop throughout 
childhood and adolescence (Carlo, 2006; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, Chaparro, & Buchmann, 
2012). What is much less known, though, are how other moral emotions develop. To date, 
developmental studies on guilt and other negatively moral emotions remain scarce, and long-
Developmental Perspective 7 
 
term longitudinal data are even rarer. There are even fewer developmental studies on positively 
valenced moral emotions.  
Kochanska and colleagues have investigated early forms of guilt, as well as its 
antecedents and outcomes (e.g., Kochanska, Barry, Jimenez, Hollatz, & Woodard, 2009).  
In our own work, we have investigated the development of guilt feelings from early childhood 
to young adulthood using both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. This developmental 
research began with the cross-sectional study of emotions in the context of hypothetical moral 
transgressions. The original focus was on the anticipation of emotions to protagonists in 
response to hypothetical moral transgressions, such as stealing another child’s chocolate or 
pushing another child off the swing. The anticipation of negative emotions, such as sadness, 
guilt, or bad feelings, has been interpreted as an empirical indicator of guilt feelings (Malti et 
al., 2009).  The classic study by Nunner-Winkler & Sodian (1988) documented that 8-year-olds 
were more likely to anticipate negative feelings to the transgressor than are 4-year-olds. This 
shift from positive to negative attributions has been labelled the “happy victimizer 
phenomenon” and replicated in various studies from Europe, the US, South America, and China 
(for reviews, see Arsenio, in press; Krettenauer, Malti, & Sokol, 2008). 
More recently, we have extended this body of research further by investigating guilt 
feelings longitudinally. For example, in a study with a Swiss sample of 175 6-year-old children 
who were reassessed at 7 and 9 years of age, we found that most children followed a high-stable 
trajectory of guilt (69%). However, another group of children showed an increase in guilt 
feelings over time (20%), and a third group of children showed a decrease in guilt feelings over 
time (11%; Malti, Eisenberg, Kim, & Buchmann, 2013).   
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 Another recent body of work has focused on children’s and adolescents’ positively 
valenced moral emotions, such as pride. This line of work shows that many adolescents, when 
having a choice between a moral and an amoral choice, chose to behave morally and anticipate 
positively valenced moral emotions (i.e., the happy moralist pattern), although some who chose 
to behave morally anticipated negative emotions (i.e., the unhappy moralist pattern). The age-
related differences for positively valenced moral emotions have mirrored the findings for 
negatively valenced emotions as they have been shown to increase with age from mid-
childhood to early adulthood (Oser, 2006; Malti, Keller, & Buchmann, 2012).   
We have recently also begun to extend this theoretical approach to moral emotions by 
including new measures that tap into more spontaneous emotional reactions towards 
transgressions. Spontaneous emotions (also known as microexpressions) are rapid and often 
unconscious emotional expressions which last for a fraction of a second (Ekman & Friesen, 
1969), thus, unlike self-reported emotions, temporally precede self-reported intentional 
cognitive thought. In conjunction with self-reported emotions,, they can provide insight into the 
roles of automatic affective and intentional cognitive processes in moral development.  We used 
innovative emotion recognition technology (Noldus’s Facereader 4.0), which uses facial 
expressions to classify basic emotional reactions, to study the spontaneous emotional 
expressions of 242 4-, 8- and 12-year-olds’ in response to moral transgressions and asked them 
about their self-reported emotions (Dys and Malti, 2013). We found that children’s levels of 
spontaneous expressions of sadness were lowest for 4-year-olds, and increased for 8- and 12-
year-olds. Meanwhile, levels of spontaneous happiness amongst 4- and 8-year-olds were 
comparable, though higher than those of 12-year-olds. Additionally, in line with traditional 
happy victimizer research, we found that 8-year-olds reported more negative (and fewer 
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positive) emotions than 4-year-olds. But, then why might 8-year-olds still show more 
spontaneous expressions of happiness?  
We interpreted these findings to suggest that intentional cognitive thought was responsible 
for the shift from positive (i.e., immoral) emotional reactions to negative (i.e., moral) emotions.. 
For example, some 8-year-olds may initially react to the positive outcomes of a moral 
transgression, such as getting to eat a chocolate bar one steals from a classmate, but then shift 
their attention toward considering the influence of their actions on the victim. Furthermore, the 
coherence between spontaneous and self-reported emotions for 12-year-olds suggests that early 
adolescents generally do not spontaneously react to the positive aspects, instead immediately 
responding to the negative aspects, of moral transgressions. We believe this shift toward 
negative spontaneous emotions in 12-year-olds may be a product of previous cognitive 
coordination processes. In other words, we suggest that as children extensively exercise this 
coordination process in middle childhood, the resulting cognitively infused emotions may 
become internalized to the point that they are reflected in automatic, spontaneous emotional 
reactions. Thus, we took the findings of this study as support for our notion of the 
interconnectedness between affective and cognitive factors in morality.  
Developmental Research on Emotions in Contexts of Social Exclusion 
Another recent line of work has extended the study of emotions in contexts of 
straightforward moral transgression to children’s and adolescents’ anticipation of moral 
emotions in multifaceted situations of social exclusion and inclusion. These contexts are 
typically more complex and require the balancing of group norms and group functioning with 
moral considerations of fairness and care (Killen, 2007; Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & 
Stangor, 2002). As such, these contexts are likely to represent children’s real-life experiences of 
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moral and social conflict. Although not many studies have investigated the development of 
emotions in these contexts, the existing findings indicate a more complex picture of the 
development of moral emotions. For example, a study on children’s emotions in contexts of 
exclusion of children with different disabilities found an expected developmental increase in the 
anticipation of moral emotions, such as guilt, to excluders, from 6 to 12 years of age (Gasser, 
Malti, & Buholzer, 2013).  
In a study on emotions in 12- and 16-year-old adolescents following social exclusion, 
the findings revealed that adolescents do frequently attribute moral emotions, such as guilt and 
sadness, to excluders. However, they also attribute amoral emotions, such as happiness and 
pride, to excluders, for reasons of group functioning. No age differences were observed (Malti, 
Killen, & Gasser, 2012). Taken together, these findings indicate that multifaceted social 
situations elicit a variety of different, sometimes conflicting moral and amoral emotions in 
young people. There is also evidence that the types of emotions anticipated in these contexts 
depend on group dynamics, as well as the interplay between group dynamics and development. 
This research has revealed that emotions associated with experiences of social exclusion can be 
altered in the presence of bystanders. For example, in a study by Strohmeier, Malti, and Killen 
(2013), 12- and 16-year-old adolescents responded to film vignettes depicting everyday 
exclusion experiences in the school context. The vignettes varied as a function of bystander 
behavior: either there was no bystander, an on-looking bystander (who did not invite the 
excluded child to join them), or an integrating bystander (who invited the child to join them). It 
was found that adolescents anticipated more happiness and pride in excluders when bystanders 
were present than when there were no bystanders. Interestingly, 16-year-olds anticipated more 
fear and empathy in the integrating bystander condition than 12-year-olds. In contrast, 12-year-
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olds anticipated more positive emotions in the integrating bystander condition than 16-year-
olds. Adolescents may increasingly understand group dynamics with age, and they may 
understand the feelings of the victim, which is why they anticipate empathy, but also anticipate 
the potentially negative consequences on their relationships with other peers following the 
inclusion of an out-group member. This may be the reason why they may anticipate more fear 
in the integrating bystander condition. Therefore, the anticipation of both moral and amoral 
emotions may indicate that they have a more nuanced understanding of the psychological harm 
associated with exclusion, but also that situations involving social exclusion involve conflicting 
moral and social-conventional considerations (Smetana, 2006).  
A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions  
We have proposed an integrative developmental model to describe the development of 
moral emotions (Malti & Keller, 2010; Malti & Ongley, 2013). Accordingly, there are 
normative developmental changes in children’s and adolescents’ anticipations of negatively 
valenced moral emotions, particularly guilt. These changes are accompanied by, and 
increasingly integrated with, moral and social knowledge. At the same time, these normative 
changes are constrained by inter-individual variations, which are associated with various 
psychological, biological, and social differences. For example, research has shown that there is 
a genetic effect on children’s empathy at 24 and 36 months of age (Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, Van 
Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008).  
We have interpreted the development of moral emotions in the framework of an affect-
cognition model (Malti, 2013), which interconnects moral emotions with moral reasoning and 
children’s social understanding (see Malti & Keller, 2010; Malti & Ongley, 2013). This is 
based on the theoretical notion proposing that the presence of moral emotions requires some 
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basic social understanding, and the endorsement of moral norms is enforced through the 
internalization of other-oriented or self-evaluative emotions (Gibbard, 1990). Although even 
infants may display basic emotional reactions in response to moral transgressions at an early 
age, these emotions would only be considered to be precursors to complex, moral emotions. 
Accordingly, moral emotions can provide an early foundation for the development of moral 
awareness because they indicate that the self feels committed to a norm (Johnston & 
Krettenauer, 2011; Malti et al., 2009). Although even young children are genuinely concerned 
with others’ welfare, they often have difficulties connecting their concern for others’ 
perspectives to their moral emotions and reasoning (Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). The 
early precursors of morality might be what has been called a “theory of agency”, which 
involves an understanding that individuals are free to behave in congruence with moral norms, 
and that those have who have committed moral transgressions have disregard these norms 
(Sokol, 2004). This process entails coordination between moral emotions, reasoning, and the 
consequences of children’s action in relation to others (Krettenauer et al., 2008. Through social 
interactions children increasingly come to understand social and moral norms and individuals’ 
agency to act in congruence with these norms.. Affectively, children are increasingly able to 
anticipate empathy or guilt as a consequence and relation of one’s own actions on others. 
Various social-cognitive prerequisites for the development of moral emotions have been 
considered, such as an interpretive theory of mind or an understanding of mixed emotions 
(Sokol & Chandler, 2003; see Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). Thus, our model describes three 
processes of development. First, children first learn to distinguish between the self and others at 
a time when they also become aware that moral transgressions have negative consequences for 
victims. However, these consequences are not taken into account emotionally, thus leading to 
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the happy victimizer phenomenon (Malti & Keller, 2010). Second, when children learn to 
coordinate the two perspectives, they realize that transgressions not only have negative effects 
on others but also to the self, which elicits negative feelings, such as guilt. Finally, by late 
childhood or early adolescence, children increasingly develop a meta-perspective, including the 
ability to reflect upon how one ought to treat others to establish and maintain trust in social 
interactions. Negatively valenced moral emotions emerge when the person violates this trust, 
while positively valenced moral emotions are a result of being in accord with one’s moral ideals 
(Malti & Keller, 2010).   
In summary, our model assumes that emotions are based on the ability to take and 
coordinate the perspective of self and other, but that this form of social understanding is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for the development of complex moral emotions. In 
addition, moral emotions and moral reasoning become increasingly coordinated and integrated 
with development. While the model expects normative changes in the anticipation of moral 
emotions across the life course, it also acknowledges discontinuity and inter-individual 
variation in the anticipation of moral emotions (see Arsenio, in press; Krettenauer & Eichler, 
2006; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013), which may occur for example due to behavioral problems in 
children (Frick & White, 2008). The model is constructivist in that acknowledges that even 
young children actively construct moral knowledge, intentions, and associated emotional 
consequences in continuous interaction with others. Research has shown that children are able 
to make moral judgments, express spontaneous empathic concern, and engage in pro-social 
behaviors from early on (e.g., Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013; Knafo & 
Plomin, 2006; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011; Turiel, 1983). Yet, the 
development of moral emotions is a lifelong process, and many of the more complex moral 
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emotions and integrative affect-reasoning processes do not yet exist in early childhood. The 
reasons for, and meaning of, the discrepancies between affect and cognition in moral 
encounters may change with development as well: for example, while discrepancies between 
moral rule knowledge and emotional reactions to transgressions may relate to cognitive 
constraints in early childhood (although even infants understand the basic distinction between 
“bad” and “good” ; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, 2007), other factors, such as motivational 
differences or situational complexity, may interact with, and potentially alter, normative change 
in multifaceted ways.  
Conclusions 
The main aim of this article was to describe a developmental perspective on moral 
emotions, one which systematically integrates affect and cognition in the emergence, and 
development, of more complex moral emotions. Developmental perspectives focus on 
normative changes in the anticipation of moral emotions, as well as discontinuities and 
constraints by inter-individual variation. Yet, most previous research has studied normative 
changes in empathy/sympathy thus far, and to a far more limited extent, in guilt feelings. Most 
other moral emotions have gone almost entirely unstudied thus far, and the few existing works 
have been limited to cross-sectional designs.  
Based on the extant literature, three promising areas of future research can be identified: 
First, while much research has been conducted on the development of empathy/sympathy, the 
systematic developmental study of both negatively and positively valenced emotions from 
childhood to adulthood is still in its infancy. Thus, systematic longitudinal research on 
positively valenced and negatively valenced moral emotions is warranted.  Normative change 
needs to be considered in relation to individual differences and within long-term perspectives. 
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Second, research on relations between various emotions, such as sympathy, guilt, and pride, as 
well as developmental changes in these relations, may help to elucidate further how children 
and adolescents experience the affective consequences of morally salient situations. Third, 
innovative methodologies for the study of children’s moral emotions are warranted. For 
example, researchers have begun to use narrative approaches to the study of moral emotion, 
which can reveal important information about how children construct their own emotional 
experiences in moral encounters (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Gasser, & Malti, 2010; Wainryb & 
Recchia, 2012). Furthermore, incorporating cognitive measures, such as eye tracking, in 
conjunction with emotion recognition technology can help developmental scientists further 
understand the interaction between attentional mechanisms and affective responses in morally 
salient situations. Finally, atypical patterns of moral emotions and their developmental 
pathways may be an important goal for further investigation, as it may contribute to our causal 
understanding of psychopathology (Frick & White, 2008). For example, extreme levels of guilt 
and altruism may be pathological (Oakley, Knafo, Madhavan, & Wilson, 2011), as may be the 
absence of any emotion in contexts of moral conflict and transgression. More research in these 
areas will make a significant contribution to the further advancement of developmental 
theoretical accounts of moral emotions. 
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